A longer introduction to Cyrenaic philosophy
Introduction:
The Cyrenaics were a minor Socratic school of philosophy based primarily in the North African city of Cyrene. The school was inspired by the person and philosophy of Aristippus the Elder, a pleasure-loving student of Socrates. The Cyrenaics taught an empiricist and sceptical epistemology (theory of knowledge) and a hedonist ethic (way of life). That’s to say, they argue that we can have certain knowledge of our inner experiences — for example, that I am tasting an apple — but that we cannot have knowledge about the causes of our experiences, in this case the apple, but it applies to the external world as a whole.
And they taught that the criterion for judging which experiences are good and bad — which is to say, to be sought or avoided — is whether they are pleasant or painful. Thus, their epistemology supports their ethics. Also, as opposed to the Epicurean school, the Cyrenaics held that present, bodily pleasure is a greater good than mental pleasure, and likewise, physical pain a greater evil than mental pain.
History:
The Cyrenaic school begins with Aristippus of Cyrene, who travelled to Athens to follow Socrates — this makes him a contemporary of Plato. The name of the school, Cyrenaic, comes from Cyrene, the North African Greek colony where Aristippus hailed from. Aristippus taught his pleasure-loving philosophy to his daughter, Arete, who taught it to her son, confusingly also called Aristippus, but who was also known as the Metrodidact because he was taught philosophy by his mother.
Although Aristippus is sometimes called the founder of the Cyrenaic school, this is unlikely to be true. Aristippus, very much in line with Socrates (who he so admired), was not a systematic thinker, and the scholar Voula Tsouna has convincingly argued that Aristippus should not even be considered a strict philosophical hedonist (even though pleasure is clearly the central feature of his philosophy). Instead, it is his grandson, the Metrodidact, who founded the Cyrenaic school and developed his grandfather’s teachings into a systematic philosophy.
The philosophy which the Metrodidact developed has been called Mainstream Cyrenaicism, but around the time of Epicurus, several Cyrenaic philosophers changed Mainstream Cyrenaic philosophy and formed sub-movements of their own. These were: Hegesias, head of the Hegesiacs; Anniceris, head of the Annicereans; and Theodorus, head of the Theodoreans. For whatever reason, the Cyrenaic school died out after this generation, though Cyrenaic philosophy greatly influenced the more ascetic Epicurean hedonists and the Academic and Pyrrhonian sceptics.
Epistemology:
The Mainstream Cyrenaics were empiricists and sceptics. Their empiricism states that our own experience is the source of our knowledge, that our own experience is incorrigible (meaning we cannot be wrong about our own experience), and that we cannot have knowledge of the causes of our experiences. Thus the Cyrenaics would draw a sharp line between our inner experience (or pathê), such as that I am now seeing white, and the cause of this pathê, namely the computer screen in front of me. We can have incorrigible knowledge of our pathê because we have immediate access to them, but we don’t have access to their causes or the exterior world more generally.
The Cyrenaics put it thuswise: “The experience which takes place in us reveals to us nothing more than itself.” It follows from this that, to be precise in our language, we should never say, for example, “I am seeing something yellow,” but rather, “I am being yellowed,” or “I am being moved by something yellowly,” because this manner of language ensures that we are only talking about inner experience or pathê. Although this might appear a strange way to talk, it’s worth pointing out that many modern philosophers of epistemology will use similar language, for example: “I am being appeared to redly now”.
The Cyrenaics offer two arguments to justify their epistemology. Firstly, the relativity of perception. The Cyrenaics make the observation that the same object can make different people have different experiences — for example, maple syrup will taste sweet to most people, but bitter to someone who has an illness; and the very same dress that appears white to some people will appear yellow to others. From observations such as these, the Cyrenaics think we should conclude that we cannot know what external objects are really like, for after all, if your white is my yellow, how could we possibly find out which of us is right?
Arguments from the relativity of perception are actually common in ancient philosophy, but different thinkers draw different conclusions; for instance, Protagoras would likely say that we should conclude that the dress is both white and yellow to different people, while Democritus would conclude that the dress is neither white nor yellow. The Cyrenaics, on the other hand, conclude that we cannot possibly know whether the dress is white, yellow, both yellow and white, or neither yellow and white.
The second argument we can call the privacy of experience. Even if everyone describes the same object in exactly the same way — i.e. that the sky appears blue — the Cyrenaics maintain that we still cannot be certain that everyone is having the same experience. This is because each person only has access to their own experiences, not those of other people. Thus, the fact that everyone is describing the same object in the same way does not prove that we are all having the same experience. After all, what appears to me as blue may in fact appear to other people as green or red, but we could never know.
This argument anticipates a problem in modern philosophy, namely the problem of other minds — how can I know that other people have minds like mine, because I can only view their behaviour and never their thoughts?
Ethics:
The Cyrenaics are ethical hedonists, meaning they consider pleasure the highest good, that to which all your choices should ultimately be aimed, and pain the greatest evil, that which all your choices should ultimately seek to avoid. The Cyrenaics start their ethics from the Greek commonplace that the highest good is what we seek for its own sake and for the sake of nothing else. They say that pleasure is the highest good, both from the epistemic reasons above and from what is often called the cradle argument — namely, that from childhood we instinctively seek pleasure and avoid pain.
The Cyrenaics talk of pleasure and pain as either smooth or rough motions in the body, where pleasure is smooth motion and pain is rough motion. They argued that any motion which is neither smooth nor rough is therefore neither pleasant nor painful — this is an attack on Epicurus who argued, famously, that the height of pleasure is complete freedom from pain and desire. The Cyrenaics deride Epicurus for this, saying that his ideal state is that of a corpse!
The Cyrenaics distinguish between bodily pleasures (for example, bathing) and mental pleasures (for example, entertaining a fond memory) and they argue, contrary to the Epicureans, that bodily pleasures are superior to mental ones. To justify this they make the commonsensical observation that bodily pleasures are more immediate, more intense, more vivid, more vivifying, and more satisfying than mental ones, and thus, if you are an ethical hedonist, you ought to focus more on them. In a similar way, bodily pains are worse than mental pains.
The most controversial element of Cyrenaic ethics is their presentism; which is to say the way they value present pleasure over long-term or future pleasure. Most commonly, the Cyrenaics are presented as being anti-eudaimonistic — i.e. that the Cyrenaics reject the Greek commonplace that the telos is a way of life lived as a whole and instead hold that the telos is presently felt pleasure only. Likewise, the Cyrenaics are presented as rejecting future-concern — which is to say, the Cyrenaics pursue whatever will bring them pleasure in the moment and will not concern themselves with the future consequences of these actions; they will also not endure present pains for the sake of greater future enjoyment. For example: a Cyrenaic would eat immoderately and not care about enough about the damage to their future health to practise self-restraint.
However, the scholar Kurt Lampe, in his book The Birth of Hedonism, has convincingly argued against such a crude and unappealing interpretation of the Cyrenaics. On his view, the Cyrenaics did in fact have a conception of eudaimonia — of a life lived well as a whole — and did in fact have concern for their future wellbeing. Lampe points out, for example, that the Cyrenaics value training in philosophical education and virtues such as adaptability, temperance, and justice. Why would they do so if they cared only about enjoying pleasures of the moment? Lampe thinks that in fact the Cyrenaics’ valuing of education and virtue shows that they were committed to learning the practices that would help to live pleasantly long-term.
Thus, rather than interpreting the Cyrenaics as holding the radical position that we should be indifferent to the future and live only for the present, we can interpret them more generously as holding that although pleasures only have value while they are being experienced (in the present) we still have reason to care about living pleasantly and avoiding pain long-term, indeed, throughout our entire lives. Evidence for this view is found in Aristippus’ comment that “the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure”. What this shows is that Aristippus was, after all, prepared to endure present pain for the sake of greater future pleasure, and cannot be the type of crude presentist he is often accused of being.
Nevertheless, the Cyrenaics were presentists of a sort — they tend to avoid long-term planning and focus instead on the pleasures of the moment or the day, but they did so, as Lampe has argued, precisely because this ensures their long-term happiness. This is to say, contrary to the Epicureans, that the Cyrenaics think planning for the future tends to be self-defeating. Attempting to secure future happiness by bypassing present pleasure is inadvisable to the Cyrenaics because the future is uncertain and not under our control, whereas the present is much more so. Thus, it isn’t the case that the Cyrenaics are indifferent to the future, only that they think focusing on it too much is wasted energy and likely to cause anxiety. Hence the way to live pleasantly, according to the Cyrenaics, is not by anxiously planning for the future or toiling on its behalf, but rather by enjoying the pleasures which are immediately available.
Aelian says of Aristippus: “Aristippus by strong arguments advised that we should not be anxious about things past or future; arguing, that not to be troubled at such things, is a sign of a constant clear spirit. He also advised to take care only for the present day, and in that day, only of the present part, wherein something was done or thought; for he said, the present only is in our power, not the past or future; the one being gone, the other uncertain whether ever it will come.”
Later Cyrenaics:
Hegesias:
Kurt Lampe suggests that, amidst the optimistic nature of Greek philosophy, Hegesias stands as perhaps the only true pessimist. Following Cyrenaic philosophy, he maintains that pleasure is the greatest good, but that it is impossible to live pleasantly — which, as we have seen, is the Cyrenaic definition of happiness. Pleasant living is impossible because the body and mind are subject to great suffering, and what happens to us in life is not under our control but is decided by fortune. Thus, the wise man, according to Hegesias, is one who attempts to live as pain free as possible. However, rather than viewing this analgesic end as a sighing capitulation, Kurt Lampe convincingly argues that it should be seen as an aspirational, even heroic, aim — to live painlessly in a cruel world, so to say.
Because of the suffering inherent in life, Hegesias held that life itself is an indifferent — and that being alive is no more valuable than being dead. Cicero reports that Hegesias was so compelling in arguing for the indifference of life that he convinced many to kill themselves by starvation, and he was subsequently banned by the government from lecturing. Hegesias also held to an extreme psychological egoism whereby the Hegesiac sage is indifferent to both personal and political relationships, believing that the sage will be completely self-sufficient. Everything the sage needs exists within himself, and thus no other person can offer him more than he already has.
Anniceris:
Anniceris pushed back against the extreme egoism of Hegesias, and held that the sage will value personal and political relationships — especially friends — for their own sake, and will even sacrifice pleasure for them. This aspect of Annicerean philosophy is contrary to Mainstream Cyrenaicism where friendship is considered a purely instrumental good, valued only insofar as it is productive of pleasure. Anniceris’ doctrine appears to be internally inconsistent, however — how can someone devoted to maximising their own pleasure justify sacrificing for friends? Lamp offers an answer that will interest not just modern Cyrenaics but modern Epicureans too (fellow egoistic hedonists). It is a fact of human psychology that after a friendship has been established, you will come to care for your friend such that their welfare becomes, in a sense, your own. If they suffer, you will suffer (empathetically). Thus, Anniceris’ view of friendship needn’t contradict Cyrenaic egoistic hedonism.
Theodorus:
Theodorus was a student of Anniceris, and like Hegesias and Anniceris he changed Mainstream Cyrenaic philosophy. The most important of his changes is his rejection of the thesis that bodily pleasure is superior to mental pleasure. Theodorus maintained that the mental pleasure of joy is the highest good and that the mental pain of grief is the worst evil. Thus, whereas the Mainstream Cyrenaic telos is living pleasantly, the Theodorean telos is living joyfully. Indeed, he goes so far as to teach that bodily pleasure and pain are indifferents.
Theodorus, like Hegesias, endorses a strong egoism. He agrees with Hegesias that friendship is useless, because the sage will be self-sufficient and will not need friends. Unwise people, by contrast, seek friends merely to satisfy their needs — and hence, are not really friends. So as well as being useless, friendship is impossible for Theodorus. Theodorus also has a strongly relativistic conception of justice, whereby the sage relies upon his own judgement as to what is the just thing to do in different situations.
Outro:
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